In one popular view, expressed most fully in Borer (2005) , word meanings are nothing but unstructured, polysemous 'blobs' of content, with no formal properties. It is the syntactic context that shapes their meaning, and only this functional scaffolding delivers the kinds of meanings that the compositional semantics trades in. I call this the 'Blob Theory' of root meanings. I am going to argue against the Blob Theory by investigating an overlooked class of nominalizations that show properties unexpected under most classifications (Grimshaw 1990, and following): they exhibit some properties of event nominals (they can be modified by frequent/constant, cf. Borer 2003, Alexiadou 2009) but they nonetheless do not have argument structure. I provide an account of these nominalizations as eventive root nominalizations. I then examine the behaviour of these nominalizations with respect to clausal arguments. I argue that their ability to combine with clausal complements shows that roots have a structured semantics that interacts, as unexpected by Blob Theory, with the compositional semantics.
Attack of the Blob
Nominalization has always been a fertile testing ground for Blob Theory. It's a well-rehearsed observation, since the seminal work of Grimshaw 1990 , that nominalizations are multi-ways ambiguous. Some describe events, and these have at least some verbal properties, like the presence of argument structure and a systematic meaning relationship to their verbal counterparts. These Grimshaw called complex event nominals, CENs (the complex part will be important in a bit). Another kind of nominalization, a result nominal (RN), refers to a grab-bag of things related to the verb, as in (1b).
(1) a. His deliberate production of bad plays never took long. CEN b. His production was the most remarkable play ever staged. RN
In frameworks like Distributed Morphology (Marantz 1997 , Alexiadou 2001 , these differences are typically characterized by differences in what chunk of syntax is nominalized. On this view, roots are category-neutral and their meanings are highly under-specified. The syntactic context of the root plays a large role in that roots are only associated with meaning in the Encyclopedia once the syntax has been assembled. Nominalizing the root delivers the idiosyncratic grab-bag of things that characterize RNs. CENs involve the nominalization of larger structures, ones that at the very least include the internal argument. 1 If we subscribe to a view where eventive interpretations are contributed by separate pieces of morphology (which is surely true in some languages as shown by Travis 2010) , then the CEN might also include heads that introduce events. This is all to say that a plausible analysis might include more 'stuff' in CENs, as Alexiadou (2001) and Fu, Roeper, and Borer (2001) argue. I'll represent this with an Event phrase, following the tradition set by Travis. This characterization, it turns out, is both too simple for RNs and, in some circumstances, too complex for event nominals. One reason that it is too simple is that both a CEN and RN can contain the same verbalizing derivational morphology, as Ackema and Neeleman (2004) , Harley (2009) and others point out:
(3) a. His constant nominalization of verbs was incessant. CEN b. This word is a nominalization.
Result
The presence of verbalizing morphology (-ize) in (3a) and (3b) poses a puzzle for the syntax of nominalization. If -ize is a type of v (Harley 2009) , why does it not license accusative case (Harley 2009 , Alexiadou 2009 )? But these examples also present a semantic problem from the DM perspective: we get a typical RN in (3b), but the it's not just a root that's being nominal-ized; in DM, the presence of a morpheme implies the presence of a syntactic head. Moreover, on any reasonable semantic analysis -ize will have to introduce events. It's a causativizer, after all, and it's going to be impossible to define a causativizer without mentioning events or propositions. This means that the 'resources' for an eventive interpretation are available within the RN in (3b). But if that's the case, then the idiomatic interpretation of RNs cannot be attributed to their being 'low' nominalizations.
The reason that the characterization in (2) is, on the other hand, too complex comes by way of a third type of nominalization, one that has not been adequately recognized in the literature. For reasons that will become clear, this type can be called a simple event nominalization (SEN) (Borer 2003 , Alexiadou 2009 ). 2 (4) a. Nominalization is a process that renders words longer and takes place in the lexicon. SEN b. Constant observation is required to ensure the child's safety. SEN
The important thing I will demonstrate is that SENs describe the same event that their related verbs and CENs do and they accept event modifiers like frequent/constant (a novel observation, as far as I know), but they nonetheless lack the full verbal properties of CENs. The characteristic that primarily distinguishes SENs from CENs is that the former do not take internal arguments nor aktionsart modifiers. I am then going to argue that capturing the difference between RNs, SENs, and CENS requires that roots be more than underspecified blobs of meaning (cf. Borer 2005) . Roots, at least some of them, need to have the semantics of verbs. Put technically, some roots must be just as the neo-Davidsonians have it: as denoting relations between eventualities and individuals (Parsons 1990 , Kratzer 1996 . The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. I begin in §2 with background on the three types of nominalizations, simple, complex and result. I then refine the diagnostics for simple event nominals, focusing on the elements frequent/constant. That done, we will be able to identify (derived) SENs as a distinct class (and handle apparent counterexamples that Grimshaw herself was aware of). I will offer then a way to derive the three nominalizations. In §3 I turn to CP complements of nouns, which will provide evidence that root nominalizations have denotations that interact with the compositional semantics. I'll end in §4 with a demonstration that another class of clause-taking predicate (belief, claim, etc.) must be formed from roots that don't have event arguments. Taken together, the diversity of root meanings suggests that for other DM assumptions to be maintained, we can't maintain Blob Theory.
Complex vs. simple vs. Result: the diagnostics
The picture we inherit from Grimshaw (1990) , later refined in (Borer 2003) , recognizes three types of nominalizations: complex event nominal (CEN), simple event nominal (SEN) and result nominal (RN). CENs describe an event in much the way their counterpart verb does, and they take internal arguments (with the help of of ). SENs likewise describe the event associated with their parent verb, but lack an internal argument. The third type of nominalization does not denote anything like the event described by the parent verb. These RNs describe a variety of things related to the verb: a participant of the verb (e.g. an internal argument as in a belief, an assignment), a result state (the destruction), or a related concrete object (an examination).
a. The examination of the students lasted a long time. CEN b. The examination lasted a long time. SEN c. The examination was photocopied on green paper. RN
Being able to appear in the frame lasted/took x time separates CENs and SENs from RNs. Grimshaw's important discovery was that CENs require their internal arguments, just like their verbal counterparts. Grimshaw uncovered this generalization by finding various ways to independently disambiguate the nominal. One kind of disambiguation Grimshaw makes use of, following an observation by Lebeaux (1986) , involves possessors. Possessor arguments can be understood as merely related to the nominal or as bona fide agents, but the latter is possible only with a CEN. The agent interpretation can be forced by agent-oriented modifiers.
(6) a. The instructor's deliberate examination of the patient took a long time. CEN b. *The instructor's deliberate examination took a long time. SEN c. *The instructor's deliberate examination was on the table. RN (Grimshaw 1990: 51-52(11)) When the subject is necessarily an agent, the internal argument is required, i.e. it must be a CEN. Here's another example with construction, which is also three-ways ambiguous between a CEN, SEN and RN: (7) a. Sometimes it takes a bit of contextual support to let the nominal go without its internal argument and still be modified by frequent.
(12) A man should not just demonstrate his love for his partner once and a while... More frequent demonstration is required.
As far as I know, this is a novel observation (save Grimshaw's example (10)), one that is important for the classification of nominalizations. It seems that Borer (2003) and Alexiadou (2009) To review, frequent/constant are compatible with SENs. And this means that the event interpretation of a nominal is not necessarily tied to the presence of an internal argument.
SENs and CENs differ, however, in one other important way: aktionsart. Aktionsart modifiers are another tool Grimshaw uses to diagnose event nominals. The first thing to know is that CENs, but not RNs, show the same aktionsart distinctions as their associated verb phrases (Vendler 1967 , Dowty 1979 . So destroy/uction+NP is telic (allowing in-phrases but not for-phrases). The reverse holds for observe/ation+NP.
(16) a. The Romans destroyed the city in three hours/*for three hours. b. The doctor observed the patient for three hours/*in three hours.
(17) a. The total destruction of the city in two days/*for two days appalled everyone. b. Only observation of the patient for several weeks/*in several weeks can determine the most likely [course of action]. (Grimshaw 1990:58(28b/29b ))
The aktionsart modifier requires the presence of the internal argument. RNs cannot take aktionsart modifiers. Importantly, SENs cannot take aktionsart modifiers either.
( Grimshaw (1990) 's theory was designed to prevent: she tied the presence of argument structure to events. Moreover, why do SENs not accept aktionsart modifiers but they do accept modification by frequent/constant? What is different about these event diagnostics? In the next section I am going to provide a simple, semanticallybased, DM-compatible theory of nominalization that captures these divisions. The central implication is that SENs are root nominalizations. As such the next section constitutes the first half of our argument against Blob Theory.
On the formation of RNs, CENs, and SENs
In this section I am going to walk through the semantic composition of RNs, CENs, and SENs. I will attempt to capture their characteristics with as few assumptions as possible.
Roots may call for an internal argument and an event(uality) argument. (The external argument is added by a separate head, v (Chomsky 1995 , Kratzer 1996 . 'Eventuality' here includes states and event proper (Bach 1986) . For instance, assign denotes a function from individuals (type e) to events (type s) to propositions/truth values (type t).
On this set-up, it's easy to see how a CEN is formed (Salanova 2010) : the internal argument saturates the root, giving a predicate of events. I take n as the nominalizing head, associated with various pieces of nominalizing morphology, like -ment/-ation (Marantz 2001) . Both it and the preposition of I take to be semantically vacuous. (I've omitted Voice/v here; what I say is compatible with it in or out. Later in this section I will add a functional projection to CENs.)
λx.λe.assign(x)(e)

PP of problems
This nP denotes a set of events of assigning problems, and that is exactly what it seems to describe in (23). And we can imagine that a determiner, say the, may combine with properties of events just as it does with properties of individuals. (23) a. Assignment of difficult problems should take place early in the semester. b. The assignment of difficult problems should take place early in the semester.
CENs, then, are formed just like a verb phrase but with the help of nominal morphology can then combine with the determiner system. RNs take a different compositional path. Recall that many RNs describe the thing that their parent predicate's internal argument does: (24) a. He was assigned to fix the sink. b. The assignment was to fix the sink.
(25) a. He explained that he was innocent. b. His explanation was that he was innocent.
While the range of things that RNs can describe is heterogeneous and somewhat unpredictable, we do know that they don't describe the eventuality described by their related verb phrase (see previous section). A (quasi) explanation for this is easy to concoct: in RNs the eventuality argument is existentially closed off and this must be done so 'low' in the tree that the eventuality argument is not available to modification (I'll explain why below). I'll use ∃ in the object language to signal existential closure of the event argument. It will be housed on n. ∃ has the following denotation: (27) means: a set of things such that there was an event of assigning them. (In this respect, the proposal makes a prediction that RNs may entail an event; see §4 for discussion.)
We further predict correctly that RNs don't take arguments:
(29) *The assignment of the problem is on the table.
If the internal argument were saturated, you wouldn't derive the required NP meaning for assignment-you'd get a truth value, not a common noun phrase meaning. I now propose that SENs are identical to RNs, save for one minor semantic twist: in SENs, ∃ in n existentially closes off the internal argument (the individual) not the event, leaving the whole nP to denote an event. This ∃ has the following denotation: 
construct(x)(e)
This nP denotes an eventuality of construction. Its object is implicit (in virtue of existential closure). In this way we have a term that denotes the eventuality described by the root, but can lack its internal argument. The existential closure operator essentially obviates the Projection Principle/theta-criterion. This nP can now easily be modified by event-modifying adjectives like frequent/constant.
In contrast, on the natural assumption that frequent/constant are event modifiers (say type s,t , s,t ), then such modifiers cannot compose with RNs: neither the root nor the nP in (28) is of the right type.
But why can't SENs be modified by aktionsart modifiers? Aktionsart modifiers describe events, so they too combine with event-denoting phrases. Here are some informal denotations (Rothstein 2004 (Movement will have to deliver the word order that puts the PP to the right of the rootP.)
The next question is why AKT 0 can't appear in SENs? Answer: if AKT 0 attaches above the unsaturated rootP of SENs, then it will combine with the wrong semantic type: e,st not s,t . So then we ask why AKT 0 cannot merge with nP, since the nP of a SEN does denote the right type, s,t . Proposal: AKT 0 is a verbal functional head; it cannot combine with an nP 4 (but apparently it can combine with category-free phrases). SENs do not denote what verb phrases do until they are categorized. Before that, they denote relations (not properties of events). After nominalization, the semantic type admits the modifiers in (34), but the syntax prevents it. Put another way, SENs denote events but they don't denote properties of events without being nominalized. That, I contend, prevents them from being modified like CENs and verbs, with aktionsart PPs.
This line of attack even gives us a purchase on the RN nominalization, which we saw poses a problem for DM and Blob Theory too. There must be reference to events within this RN, because -ize creates (complex) event descriptions. Here's a toy denotation for -ize (it doesn't really matter what it is, but I give it a causative analysis here). I'll take it to be of category v (Harley 2009 This -ize, while it introduces an eventuality and is of category v, doesn't admit aktionsart modifiers if it forms part of an RN. Here's why. I won't decompose nominal, to keep the tree simpler (even though it is itself complex); it describes nominal things (or maybe the corresponding nominal states). 
λx.nominal(x)
The result here is an RN, but it contains more than just a root; it contains the 'resources' for an event interpretation. And this is what we want, at least if we wish to maintain the DM assumption that the presence of a morpheme (here -ize) reflects syntactic structure. (Again, the implication of this RN is that there is some event of making the nominal. See §4 on this prediction.) Moreover, even though there are the 'resources' for an event interpretation in (37), that event is not available for modification. Just as with SENs, there is no node in (37) that isn't a nP that is of the right type for AKT 0 (and therefore an aktionsart modifier) to combine with. The node nominal is not an event. The vP node does describe events, but the individual argument is not saturated, so it's not the right type yet. And the whole nP denotes a thing such that there is an event of making that thing nominal: there's no event here to modify. Also ruled out is modification by frequent/constant on the hypothesis that these can only modify event-denoting nouns.
Stepping back from these details, an important conclusion here is that SENs are root nominalizations. They are no 'bigger' than RNs-and sometimes they're smaller, as with (37). Both have the 'resources' for an event interpretation, but only in the latter is it available.
So far none of this has directly been an argument against Blob Theory. And at this point Blob Theorists might be thinking of all sorts of ways to syntacticize the observations I've documented. How would such approaches capture the differences between SENs, CENs and RNs.
Take the difference between SENs and RNs? Can we 'construct' those meanings from blobby roots? To do so we would need to make decisions about the content of the root. Do we 'sever' the internal argument (Borer 2003 , Ramchand 2008 , but cf. Kratzer 2002)? Do we 'sever' the event argument? What would such a root even mean? Or do we say nothing about the root, and only assign it meaning if there are functional heads above it? If the latter is the case, then RNs and SENs would both require some functional structure above them, and I see no reason to think that SENs would have more such structure than RNs. One could postulate that SENs differ from RNs in having an Event phrase (see (2)), but given the discussion of the RN nominalization above, this in itself won't deliver the difference between RNs and SENs.
In sum, the present proposal captures the form and meanings of SENs (particularly, their heretofore undocumented status as non-argument taking, eventdenoting phrases). In the next section I want to show an interesting interaction between SENs and CP complements that, given the above conclusions about SENs as root nominalizations, argues for structured root meanings.
CPs and the Blob
In this section I show that clause-taking verbs can only form SENs and RNs (see Travis, Jeannot-Fils, and Botouhely 2013 (this volume) for related observations about Malagasy fact-and claim-nominals). I then show that CP complements can appear with SENs (and RNs), but not as arguments. I will offer an explanation for this based on some new proposals about the denotations of CPs (Kratzer 2006 , Moulton 2009 , Caponigro and Polinsky 2011 , Moulton 2013a . Finally, I demonstrate that in order to capture this state of affairs, roots must have a structured meaning, one with which CPs compose by known compositional mechanisms (in this case, Restrict, Chung and Ladusaw 2004).
Nominalization of clause-taking roots
When clause-taking predicates are nominalized, they often don't refer to the eventuality described by the verb, but to the thing "verbed" (Higgins 1972 ).
(38)
Paul's explanation/claim/observation/belief was that he was temporarily insane. (Stowell 1981: 199(154 
))
The copular relation here is specificational (or 'equative') and this means that whatever the CP refers to, so does the nominalization. So these are RNs. Some clause-taking nominalizations can also be predicated of event predicates, showing that they can be SENs.
(39) a. Paul's explanation that he was insane took too long. SEN b. Sue's demonstration that she wanted the job lasted all day. SEN Crucially, however, clause-taking nominalizations never form CENs. The aktionsart modifier diagnostics show this the best. Grimshaw's minimal pair with DPvs. CP-taking observe/ation illustrates the striking contrast.
(40) DP-taking observation a. We observed the butler for several weeks. b. Observation of the butler for several weeks is needed. This isn't just a property of these particular predicates. Nor is it some deep incompatibility between the meanings of these predicates and event nominalization. Some DP and CP-taking verbs (not all, of course, but some) can form event nominalizations with their DP objects (expressed in of -PPs)-even those DP arguments that bear the same relation to the verb that the CP appears to. But no CP is allowed.
(47) a. Lisa explained the problem in two minutes flat. b. Lisa's explanation of the problem in two minutes flat (impressed me). c. *Lisa's explanation that there was problem in two minutes flat (impressed me).
(48) a. John suggested that possibility for so many years. b. John's suggestion of that possibility for so many years (got tiresome) c. *John's suggestion that he father a child for so many years (got tiresome).
Nominalizations that take CPs just cannot form complex eventuality nominals. 5
Can clause-taking nouns be modified by frequent/constant? Grimshaw gives (49) as evidence that they cannot. But Pesetsky and Torrego (2002) offer (50) and (51), which they claim shows that the presence of the CP is necessary to license the adjective, something we'd expect if clause-taking nouns were CENs (Ogawa 2001) . (49) a. *Their frequent/constant announcement that they were the greatest eventually became tiresome. b. *His frequent/constant statement that he was about to resign was intended to mislead. (Grimshaw 1990: 75-76 While not perfect, the context in (53) makes it clear what the claim is. Of course, the skeptic might say that this context pretty much just makes these CEN, with the object implied (perhaps present as a null pro). That can't be the answer though, Some naturally occurring examples, however, suggest that knowledge is not a counter-example:
(ii) a. Our current knowledge is that light exhibits a dual nature or behaviour. b.
My limited knowledge of returning missionaries was that they were basically hands off until they were "debriefed"; is this unusual? c.
My only knowledge of it was that there was an image of it on a punt coin at some stage. The first thing that struck me was how modern it was.
because an implied or null object, if it were there, should allow an SEN to be modified by an aktionsart PP. As we know, however, that is not possible.
(54) a. *The destruction in an hour disturbed me. b. *The explanation for an hour that John was the murderer.
In sum, clause-taking verbs form SENs (and RNs) but not CENs. And when they are SENs they can combine with CPs (see (39)). That in itself is a puzzle: if CPs are arguments, how come they don't serve to make CENs? The answer to this puzzle comes from the semantic type of CP complements, and it is to this proposal I turn next. Once I introduce this proposal, I will turn back to the argument from CPs against Blob Theory.
A predicative analysis of CPs
Building on (Kratzer 2006) , Moulton (2009 Moulton ( , 2013a develops an analysis which argues that CPs are predicative and do not saturate argument positions. There is a very straightforward argument that CPs do not saturate nouns (see Moulton 2013b on how CPs combine with verbs and adjectives). CPs can appear with nouns that have no arguments to begin with! Nouns can, in general, take DP arguments as long as case is made available, with a preposition. This can be seen for de-verbal nouns in (55) and relational nouns in (56) It is not possible, however, to replace the CP complements of some nouns with a DP-even with the help of a preposition. This is true for non-derived nouns, as in (57a). 6
(57) a. *I don't believe { the idea, idea, notion, theory, scoop, myth } of that. b. I don't believe { the idea, idea, notion, theory, scoop, myth } that Edna left.
And it is true of many derived nominals: the verbs in (58)-(60) take DP internal arguments but their object nominalizations cannot (Zucchi 1989) .
a. *John's belief of that idea. b. John believed that idea.
(59) a. *John's claim of something. b. John claimed something.
(60) a. *Her thought of that. b. She thought that.
These are object (RN) nominalizations, of course, and we've re already seen why these are not internal argument-takers. This then is an existence argument for CPs that don't to saturate nouns. The idea that CPs don't saturate the nouns they appear with goes back to at least Higgins (1972) and Stowell (1981) , who recorded the intuition that CPs in post-copular position can sometimes even explicitly identify the content of the noun. (61) a. The fact that Edna was stealing (is apparent). b. The fact is that Edna was stealing.
(62) a. The belief that Edna was stealing (is false). b. The belief is that Edna was stealing.
(63) a. Paul's explanation that he was temporarily insane. b. Paul's explanation was that he was temporarily insane. (Stowell 1981: 199(154 
))
As Grimshaw (1990) shows, true arguments cannot be separated from their selecting nouns like this, across a copula. To make this point, Grimshaw contrasts genitives in two roles. In (64), the genitive is possessive (hence, in Grimshaw's system, a modifier). It can be post-copular.
(64) a. John's dog. b. The dog is John's (Grimshaw 1990: 97(118a) )
The genitive in (65), on the other hand, is an argument-this construction being a passive nominal. This genitive cannot occur in post-copular position.
(65) a. The building's construction. b. *The construction was the building's. (Grimshaw 1990: 97(121b) )
Arguments cannot appear in post-copular position. Since clausal complements of nouns can appear in post-copular position, they are not arguments. For further evidence for the non-argument status of CP complements of nouns (for instance, their counter cyclic behaviour, typical of adjuncts) see Moulton (2013a) . I know of at least two worked-out semantic proposals that capture the nonargument status of CPs that appear with nouns. Both Potts (2002) and Kratzer (2006) treat CPs, when they combine with nouns, as restricting rather than saturating. 7 Here I follow Kratzer, and the development of her proposal in Moulton (2009) and Moulton (2013a) . I will not rehearse the semantics here, but the proposal likens CP complements to relatives in the sense that they do not saturate argument positions. Rather, CPs identify the content of an argument position. They are predicative type, and combine with nouns by Predicate Modification, not function application (see references above for details). An adequate paraphrase for CPs, one that captures the likeness to relative clauses, is the following: 8 (66)
The idea that Bob is a fraud ≈ The idea the content of which is that Bob is a fraud
The noun idea-like myth, idea, fact-is a non-derived nominal that denotes a thing with propositional content. It's common noun, type e,t . I use x p for variables that pick out things with propositional content (to distinguish them for 'ordinary' individuals). These content nouns simply combine with a CP by Predicate Modification (Heim and Kratzer 1998) . CP: λx p .the content of which x p is that Bob is a fraud: e,t that Bob is a fraud Now let's examine how this works with nominalizations. A root like explain or propose or believe can form a RN, in which case the eventuality argument is closed off. It's an object nominal. What kind of object does explain, propose and guess take? A thing that has propositional content: they take as their internal argument the kinds of nouns like idea, story, rumour, content.
John explained/believed/proposed that idea/story/myth/proposition.
7 The difference is in whether the basic type of CPs is type e or e,t . There are arguments on both sides (see Moulton 2009) , but the evidence from the ban on CENs motivates the predicative denotation.
8 Kayne (2009) and Arsenijevic (2009) actually postulate a gap corresponding to something like this meaning, a predicate of which they derive by relative operator movement. Caponigro and Polinsky (2011) offer morphological evidence for such a gap in complement declarative clauses (among others) in Adyghe. In the present account there is no such gap or relativization operation, but the net result is a predicative meaning.
So a RN of explain denotes a property of 'things explained.' The CP can then restrict this noun. Alternatively, following (Kratzer 2006 ) the CP can restrict this argument of the root via a mode of composition Chung and Ladusaw (2004) But explain+CP cannot form a CEN: an event description (with a saturated internal argument) will never be formed with a CP complement, given the hypothesis that CPs don't saturate.
9 Restrict is defined as:
Let α and β be sisters such that α and β are of type e,st and type e,t , respectfully. This whole nP describes and event of explaining something, which is (those content of which is) that Fred left. The whole nP denotes an event of doing this. And this is what we want. As we saw, clause-taking predicates can form SENs with CP complement (repeated from (39)): (71) a. Paul's explanation that he was in trouble was long/lasted all day. b. Sue's demonstration that she was innocent took way too long.
These SENs can no more be modified by aktionsart PPs than the SENs we examined in §2. What's particularly instructive about (70) and (71) is that the root makes the individual argument (x p ) available to the CP via Restrict, but the nominalization is an event nominal. And because of this I can now finally make my case against Blob Theory. If SENs are, as they are shown here in (70), 'root' nominalizations, and if CPs combine by Restrict, then the root must be a piece of language with the kinds of truth-conditional meanings that the compositional semantics trades in.
Clause-taking predicates are unique in letting us see this because CPs can Restrict their argument positions. Other arguments, like DPs and PPs, can only saturate, so they can't combine with SENs. Further, CP arguments are different from CP relatives and adjectives in this respect as well. A garden-variety adjective or headed relative clause must combine with an NP that saturates an argument position: John ate the cake that Mary baked/*John ate that Mary baked. That's why we would never know with non-CP arguments whether there was an internal argument slot hanging around inside SEN roots. But there are such 'slots', which means that roots are more than just polysemous blobs of content.
Event-less roots
The claim has been that some roots must specify an internal and an event argument. This doesn't necessarily mean that all roots that form verbs have event arguments. There is another class of clause-taking predicates that never forms an event nominal. These include zero-derived clause-taking predicates: (72) a. *The claim that John was guilty was long. b. *The belief that pigs fly occurred for a long time.
Not only do these predicates not form SENs, the way they form RNs can't be the same as, say, explanation. The reason is that there is no entailment that there is an event at all in (73): (73) The claim that pigs fly is a claim that no one has or would make.
If we gave nominal claim the same kind of derivation that we gave RN explanation (see (69)) it would commit us to the following meaning:
(74) claim = the set of things x p such that there was an event of claiming x p and the content of x p is that pigs fly.
But (73) does not entail there was such an event. Claims are like ideas and proposals: no event of claiming, formulating or proposing them needs to have happened. Event control also diagnoses that there is no event argument hanging around in these nominalizations. Event nominals allow an implicit event to be picked up by a controlled PRO (Grimshaw 1990): (75) a. The translation of the book (in order) to make it available to a wider readership. b. The assignment of hard problems (in order) to challenge students is encouraged.
Unambiguous RNs do not allow event control:
(76) a. *The translations of the book in order to make it available to a wider readership b. *The assignment to fix the sink in order to challenge students is encouraged.
Zero-derived nominalizations of clause-taking verbs do not allow event control either:
a. *The claim that there is a problem in order to scare everyone. b. Claiming that there is a problem in order to scare everyone.
If there were any event (existentially quantified or otherwise) hanging about here, we would we expect it to allow for implicit control.
Here then we may have genuine evidence that a root is highly underspecified. Suppose the roots of claim and belief have just common noun meanings: a claim is like a idea, it describes some thing with propositional content. Crucially, there is no event described by these roots. They're type e,t . (78) a.
These combine with CPs by Predicate Modification. This leads to the immediate consequence that the verbal believe and claim must involve the addition of verbalizing morphology, and these verbalizers introduce an event argument. 10
These little v's will have denotations, which I omit here (they will select for common noun meanings). What prevents these structures from forming complex event nominalizations? Here we must appeal to Myer's generalization, which blocks various kinds of derivational operations after zero derivation.
(80) Myers's Generalization (Pesetsky 1995: 75(223 We can now apply the same reasoning to why claim and belief never form CENs. Myers's Generalization rules out forming an event nominal-complex or otherwisefrom claim/belief. Because v make/hold is null it blocks further derivation by n. If unergatives have a similar analysis (Hale and Keyser 2002) , then the same reasoning would apply in ruling out CENs of such verbs. I think this is a correct prediction; nominalizations of unergative roots cannot take aktionsart modifiers.
(86) a. *John's jump for three minutes. b. *Sue's dance for hours.
What I have hoped to show in this section is that some clause-taking roots are deficient in lacking an event argument. But this just goes to show that roots have formal properties, and can be differentiated.
Conclusion
The first half of this paper identified a type of nominalization, SENs, which denote the same eventuality as their (counterpart) verbs and CENs, but nonetheless lacked two important things: argument structure and the ability to be modified by aktionsart PPs. Nonetheless, SENs can combine with event modifiers like frequent/constant. As such, derived SENs are clear counterexamples to theories like Grimshaw's where argument structure is tied to events. I then offered a way of understanding the difference between CENs, SENs, and RNs. The main main implication was that SENs are root nominalizations. This further entailed that root nominalizations have the 'resources' to denote events.
I then went on to examine clause-taking nominalizations. I showed that CPs don't saturate nouns, but rather restrict them. We learned this because of the absence of clause-taking CENs. But CPs can restrict clause-taking SENs, and the only way to do this is to let them compose with the root. And that means that a root must have meanings of the sort compositional semantics trades in. Lastly, I argued that we need to differentiate among roots ( belie f vs. explain), in a way that also calls upon giving roots meanings that feed directly into the compositional semantics.
Of course, it is purported that Blob Theory is good at explaining the kinds of idiosyncrasies we find with RNs, which refer to an unpredictable (so far as I know) grab bag of things. So for instance, translation can be an RN, but it describes neither the verb's internal argument nor a result state, but rather a resulting thing. I don't know how that meaning can be sourced from a root meaning by standard compositional mechanisms. Moreover, I can't explain why destruction only forms an RN that denotes a result state, not an RN that denotes a thing destroyed: (87) a. The destruction was widespread. b. *The destruction was a building over there.
Maybe destroy doesn't have an internal argument (perhaps some internal arguments are severed), but rather it describes a state of destruction (Harley 2009 ). But does Blob theory explain why the RN destruction means one thing and not the other, either? In fact, I worry that Blob Theory suggests we don't even try to figure it out: who knows what's in the blob? That may turn out to be true, but it's not the best methodology. We may discover something if we attack the blob.
